The general context of application
By analyzing the typology and the physiognomy of the current conflicts, we can ascertain that their characteristic is the accentuation of the asymmetric component of the actions, manifested most often in urban operational environments. Even in the case of the most ardent supporters of this principle, it cannot be argued that in the future conflicts will only be of this nature, even if that is possible. Instead, we can state without any restraint that they will certainly have both a conventional component and an unconventional component, their share in using them varying and generating real challenges in anticipating them. Regarding the operational environment, it would be wrong to argue that military operations will only be carried out in urban environments, even if there is a trend in this respect, especially at the level of decisive operations, which, as we know, determine the outcome of the confrontations. In this respect, the tendency of military operations in urban environments is supported by a series of studies and researches conducted in the field of military operations, which identified the following factors of the current and future operational environments, thus [1] :
 complexity -due to the presence in the operational environment of other actors such as the intergovernmental organizations (Intergovernmental Organization -IO), non governmental organizations (NonGovernmental Organizations -NGO), private security companies, etc.; in other words, complexity is also demanded by the need of the military forces to act at joint, intergovernmental and multinational level (Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational -JIIM) in order to combat the typology of current threats [2] ;
 the uncertainty/unpredictabilityresults from the ability of hypothetical opponents, especially non-state opponents, to use violence at fairly high levels; this is explained by the difficulty of combating because they use unconventional (asymmetric) military rules and tactics, but also by their habit to camouflage among locals, making it difficult to get their Positive Indentification (PIDs);
 access to vital resources -is already a problem due to increased consumption and implicitly reduced quantity; the research carried out estimates that competition for rare resources, energy resources, food and water can degenerate into military confrontations in the medium and long term;
 the population as a center of gravitythe success of a hypothetical adversary depends to a large extent on attracting the population to the side of their own military forces, gaining the hearts and minds of the local population; in this respect, the understanding of the operational environment, especially in terms of sociocultural aspects, is essential;  urbanization -the uncontrolled growth of the population and its concentration in urban areas can lead to accentuation of crime and instability; on the other hand, they all create favorable conditions for violent manifestations of terrorist, separatist groups, etc .;
 population migration -generates real political, social and cultural challenges on the basis of the tensions arising between local people and immigrants; another important aspect is that of uncontrolled immigration that favors illicit, terrorist activities. Another perspective that should be considered is the typology of threats in urban environments, which, compared to other operational environments, is much more diversified, usually having the following configuration: conventional threats consisting of military forces and paramilitary forces; unconventional threats defined by insurgency/guerrilla, terrorists, organized crime, partisans with external support, militarized criminal gangs, community rebellions, violent lawless gangs, demonstrators, transitory phenomena, displaced persons and refugees (DPRE) or internally displaced persons (IDP) [3] . Also, the correlated use of conventional and unconventional elements generates the hybrid aspect of the opponent's actions. As a consequence for the military structures, the approach of such environments characterized by the asymmetry accentuation, the diverse typology of hypothetical opponents and the high density of infrastructure/population implies a permanent operational adaptation, implicitly leading to a reconfiguration of the organizational structures. The military forces, and in particular their leadership, were confronted with such operational environments, considered volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) on the theaters of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine [4] .
Principles of operational approach of urban type environments
For the purpose of this article, the operational adaptation of military structures to urban environments implies the application of specific principles such as mission command and maneuverist approach. Developed at the level of the British Army, these concepts have been taken over by most modern armies and are now being applied to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as fundamentals of land forces operations. According to the NATO doctrine of the land forces operations, mission command refers to that "command philosophy based on the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution, promoting the utmost freedom of action and initiative" [5] . Other points of reference for defining this concept are those of the British and American armies. The British outlook identifies command by missions as representing "the command type philosophy that promotes unity of effort, duty and authority to act, and the freedom of action of commanders of subordinate structures" [6] . Instead, the American doctrine integrates command through missions within unified land operations. According to it, command by missions consists in "exercising authority and leadership by the commander through mission orders that ensure the manifestation of the disciplined initiative within the commander's intention to give leaders the agility and adaptability needed to conduct unified land operations" [7] . Regardless of the adopted approach (British, American, German, etc.), the essence of the mission command consists of the following aspects [8] :  transmitting orders by the commander so that the subordinates can understand his intention, his own missions and the context of their accomplishment;  clear indication to the subordinates of what they have to do (the immediate effect) and why it is necessary (purpose);  assuming the responsibility by the subordinates regarding respecting the commander's intent during execution (what to do);  decision making by subordinates on the fulfillment of missions (how to fulfill);  allocation of resources necessary for subordinates to carry out missions;  using a minimum level of control that does not limit the subordinates' freedom of action and initiative. Another principle applicable to the conduct of military operations in urban environments is that of maneuverist approach. In order to maximize the effects on the opponent, the maneuverist approach is applied by correlation with the mission command, as "the mission command philosophy is a key aspect of the maneuverist approach. allowing subordinate commanders the flexibility and authority to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy as they are discovered" [9] . Consequently, the principle of maneuverist approach has an "indirect character, aiming rather at engaging the moral component of the enemy's fighting power than the physical one" [10] . Even so, it is not based solely on the use of non-lethal means, as we would be tempted to believe, but on a combination of these and the lethal ones, proposing as effects the shaping/ distorting of understanding, the diminishing of the will to fight, and not last resort, affecting the opponent's cohesion [11] . Other key aspects of the maneuverist approach are given by the following characteristic features [12] :  understanding the situation -focus on the operational environment and the opponent;  influencing perceptions -all involved actors (opponents, supporters, neutral) are concerned;  obtaining and maintaining the initiativenecessary to dictate the way in which further action is taken;  diminishing the opponent's cohesion and the will to fight -the central element of the maneuverist approach; cohesion and the will to fight can often be determined as the center of gravity of the enemy;  protecting the friendly forces' cohesion and the will to fight -is the defensive part of the maneuverist approach. On the other hand, the principle of maneuverist approach helps us to build the conceptual framework for planning and conducting operations in the urban environment, assuming to pursue the following algorithm: understanding, shaping, engagement, consolidation and transition (USECT) [13] . Taking as an example one of the most difficult operations that a military structure can carry out in urban environments, namely the offensive operation, table no. 1 presents the essential tasks, respecting the USECT algorithm. [14] UNDERSTAND  deployment of IPB/JIPOE ISR is essential in all phases and in all dimensions SHAPE  movement to the layout area/attack positions;  isolation of the urban area: -providing information on the layout of the enemy; -coordination of fire support; -prevention of enemy withdrawal; -prevention of the flow of enemy reinforcements/reserves.  misleading (fake attack, demonstration attack);  the penetration (the actual assault): -establishing a base (bridgehead) for the development of offensive actions; -conquering key objectives; -establishing routes to reach subsequent alignments.  securing key infrastructure (medical centers, electrical centers, CBRN production and storage facilities);  managing hostile crowds (crowd control);  protection/evacuation of non-combatants (civilian population).
ENGAGE
 advancement to key objectives;  provision of lines of communication (LOC) and main supply routes (MSR);  isolation of key objectives (requires a plan to remove obstacles);  acquisition of key objectives (includes a plan to achieve fire support);  removal of remaining resistances (from objectives);  reorganization to and around the conquered objectives to discourage enemy counterattacks.
CONSOLIDATE
 maintaining the conquered objectives;  elimination of remaining resistances;  implementation of the defensive fire support plan;  elimination of CBRN and WMD threats;  controlling the urban environment through: -patrol; -observation / monitoring; -elimination of IED; -isolation and search (cordon & search); -securing routes; -protection of convoys; -crowd control; -managing prisoners; -managing the civilian/refugee population.
TRANSITION
 participation in the restoration of local government;  local population support through: -ensuring the mobility of communication channels; -restoration of aerodromes, ports, etc.; -ensuring primary needs (water, fuel, electricity); -restoring public services (health, public administration); -providing health care; -ensuring humanitarian support; -securing the key infrastructure; -supporting the operationalisation of local security forces.
Under the conditions of fragmentation and dispersion of combat actions, which strongly characterize the offensive operation in the urban environment, the management of the complexity of the essential tasks by the military structures involved can be achieved only by the coherent and correlated application of the two principles, namely the maneuverist approach and mission command .
Conclusions
With the two concepts clarified, it is somewhat much easier to understand why these two approaches should be applied in addressing unfamiliar operational environments in general and urban ones in particular. If the maneuverist approach is required by the necessity of modeling the urban operational environment, consisting in understanding the opponent, influencing him and the other parties involved, as well as in diminishing the cohesion and, implicitly, the motivation to fight, the mission command is necessary particularly during the execution of the operation, where, especially under urban operational environments, commanders of subordinate structures, based on their own decisions, demonstrate initiative and freedom of action, certainly respecting the commander's intention. At the same time, the results of research conducted in the field of military operations in urban environments highlighted the fact that the most appropriate way to manage the fight against hypothetical opponents is to delegate authority to the lowest level, even to the fighter, respecting the principle of command by missions, which is based on the realization of a Common Operational Picture (COP), the respect of the commander's intention, the formation of a sense of mutual trust, the prudent acceptance of risks, and, last but not least, the promotion of the initiative on a large scale. Exercising this modality of command in the urban environment leads to the improvement of the military personnel's reaction capacity, positively influencing the likelihood of exploiting the opportunities that have arisen during the operation, as no supplementary approvals and directions are required which need additional time. Finally, in order to be able to achieve the desired final states, especially in urban environments, the adoption of the technique of small steps is recommended, which implies the gradual weakening of the urban adversary, a rule which, as we have seen, lies at the basis of the principle of maneuverist approach. Only by the gradual weakening of the enemy's cohesion in conjunction with the high quality execution of mission command, commanders and general staff can produce synergic effects, hard to counteract by the adversary, ultimately resulting in his defeat.
